Fall 2008 (Presenters' names are in parentheses)

  • Prediction Markets, (SIEPR paper no. 03-25), J. Wolfers and E. Zitsewist, 2004 (Dasgupta)
  • Non-myopic Strategies in Prediction Markets (EC2008) Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami (Jumadinova)
  • The Effects of Market-Making on Price Dynamics (AAMAS 2008) Sanmay Das (Kahorongo)
  • Interpreting the Predictions of Prediction Markets - Manski (Lankin)
  • Risk Aversion, Beliefs and Prediction Market Equilibrium - Gjerstad (Walenz)
  • Greedy Approaches for Solving Task Allocation Problems with Coalitions (AAMAS 2008 workshop on Formal Methods in Multi-robot Sys)– Koenig, Zheng (Fan)
  • Agent Coordination with Regret Clearing (AAAI 2008) – Koeing, Zheng et al. (Cheng)
  • A Realistic Model of Frequency Based Multi-robot Polyline Patrolling (AAMAS 2008)– Elmaliach, Shiloni, Kaminka (Dasgupta)
  • Multi-robot Perimeter Patrol in Adversarial Settings (ICRA 2008)– Agmon, Kraus, Kaminka (Jumadinova)
  • The Impact of Adversarial Knowledge on Multi-robot Perimeter Patrolling (AAMAS 2008) - Agmon, Kraus, Kaminka (Kahorongo)
  •  Bitbots: Simple Robots Solving Complex Tasks (ICRA 2005) - Yershova, Tovar, Ghrist, LaValle (Dasgupta)

 

Spring 2008 (Raj Dasgupta, Ke Cheng, Li Fan, Janyl Jumadinova)

Fall 2006 (Raj Dasgupta, Matthew Hoeing, David Miller)

Learning and Games

  •  Playing Games in Many Possible Worlds Seth Gilbert (MIT), April Rasala Lehman (Google), Matt Lepinski (MIT), David Liben-Nowell (Carleton College) (Presenter: Miller)
  • Learning From Revealed Preference Eyal Beigman (Northwestern University), Rakesh Vohra (Northwestern University) (Presenter: Dasgupta)

Network Economics

  • Efficient Strategyproof Multicast in Selfish Networks Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wan (Presenter: Hoeing)
  • Designing Multicast Protocols for Non-cooperative Networks
    W. Wang, X. Li, Z. Sun, Y. Wang  (Presenter: Miller)
  • Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General Framework
    M. Kao, X. Li, W. Wang   (Presenter: Hoeing)
  • Nash Equilibria and Dominant Strategies in Routing
    Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li, and Xiaowen Chu (Presenter: Dasgupta)

Agents and Mechanism Design

  • A Sufficient Condition for Truthfulness with Single Parameter Agents Nir Andelman (Tel-Aviv University), Yishay Mansour el-Aviv University ) (Presenter: Dasgupta)
  • Multi-Attribute Coalitional Games Samuel Ieong (Stanford University), Yoav Shoham (tanford University) (Presenter: Miller)
  • Approximation Algorithms and Online Mechanisms for Item Pricing Maria-Florina Balcan (Carnegie Mellon University), Avrim Blum (Carnegie Mellon University)  (Presenter: Hoeing)
  • Regret-based Incremental Partial Revelation Mechanisms
    Nathanaël Hyafil and Craig Boutilier  (Presenter: Dasgupta)
  • Robust Mechanisms for Information Elicitation
    Aviv Zohar and Jeffrey Rosenschein  (Presenter: Miller)

Congestion Games

  •  Congestion and Potential Games Overview Y. Mansour (Lecture notes from Computational Learning Theory course)  (Presenter: Hoeing)Selfish load balancing and atomic congestion games Subhash Suri, Csaba Toth, Yunhong Zhou  (Presenter: Dasgupta)